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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of Evidence in State
Courts Obtained by Invasion of Bodily Integrity
That the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the fed-
eral Constitution prohibits the use in state courts of evidence obtained
through coerced confessions was first decided in Brown v. Mississippi,1
where three defendants were convicted of murder in a state court solely
on the basis of confessions wrung from them by physical torture. In
reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the use of confessions obtained in such a manner was a denial of
due process. The Court held four years later that the due process clause
was violated when a defendant's confession was obtained after protracted
questioning lasting five days and climaxed by an all night session.2 But
protracted questioning alone does not necessarily violate due process,
and information thus obtained may be admissible.3  On the other hand,
a confession was found to be coerced where defendant was subjected to
psychological humiliation by being kept naked for several hours and put
in fear of being tortured.4  The Court further extended due process
protection by excluding a confession obtained by a state employed
psychiatrist who extracted the confession from a physically exhausted de-
fendant by subtle, suggestive questioning.5
In this line of cases the test used to determine whether the require-
ments of due process of law had been met was whether or not the con-
duct of state officers had offended what the Court terms a "sense of
justice."6  Furthermore, the use of a coerced confession may result in
1297 U. S. 278 (1936). For an extensive review of the state court cases through
1948, see Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause, 15 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 51 (1949).
This Note will only be concerned with cases which have originated in state, as
opposed to federal, courts. The self incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
of the Constitution prohibits the use in federal courts of evidence obtained through
coerced confessions. Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). However, in
later cases arising in federal courts, the Supreme Court has held "involuntary"
confessions inadmissible on an evidentiary, rather than constitutional, basis. Up-
shaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948) ; Adamson v. United States, 318 U. S.
350 (1943) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
2 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
'Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
'Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 556 (1945).5 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286 (1936). In Leyra v. Denno, 347
U. S. 556 (1954), the Court gives little or no indication of the application of a
particular test. After an extensive review of the facts, Mr. Justice Black merely
stated: "We hold that the use of confessions extracted in such a manner . . .is
not consistent with due process of law as required by our Constitution." Id. at 561.
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a reversal of conviction even though statements made in the confession
be independently established as true7 or even where other evidence alone
would be adequate to sustain a conviction if the Court cannot determine
that the verdict was based solely on the admissible evidence.8
In 1952, in Rochin v. California,9 the concept of inadmissibility of
coerced confessions was broadened to include real, as opposed to verbal,
evidence obtained by a flagrant violation of bodily integrity. In this
case police officers entered the defendant's home without a warrant
and unsuccessfully attempted forcibly to prevent him from swallowing
two morphine capsules. The defendant was then handcuffed and taken
to a hospital where the capsules were obtained by the forcible use of an
emetic solution. The use of this evidence resulted in his conviction in
the state court of illegal possession of morphine. Since the Supreme
Court was of the view that "to sanction the brutal conduct ... would be
to afford brutality the cloak of law,"'1 the conviction was reversed. The
Court could not rely for reversal on the privilege against self incrim-
ination,"1 nor could it rely on the unreasonable search and seizure cases
without overruling the well-established Wolf case.12  Thus, in order
to condemn such police practice, the Court resorted to the coerced con-
fession type cases.' 3 In determining that the coercion and brutality
present here was a violation of due process, the Court used the same
nebulous criterion it applied in Brown v. Mississippi,'4 i.e., "that con-
victions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice,' "'s and spoke with approval of the lack of well defined limits
in determining what constitutes an invasion of human rights.'6
"Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50 n. 2 (1949), 28 N. C. L. Ray. 390 (1950).
'Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 606 (1948) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.
401, 402 (1945) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 597 (1944) ; Note, 40 CALrF.
L. REv. 311, 314 (1952). But see Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 189-92(1953), 32 N. C. L. Rxy. 98.
p342 U. S. 165 (1952), 30 N. C. L. Rav. 287. 10 342 U. S. at 173.
"' Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). This case held that the fifth
amendment's exemption from compulsory self incrimination was not included with-
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, abridgment
of this privilege by the states constituted no violation of the federal Constitution.1
' In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), the Court, through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment included
protection of the individual from unwarranted search and seizure, but that the
exclusion of evidence thus obtained from a state criminal prosecution was not "an
essential ingredient of that right," id. at 29, and that the doctrine of excluding
such evidence, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), would be limited
to federal courts.13 "It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of consti-
tutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man
the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in
his stomach." Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173 (1952).1"297 U. S. 278 (1936). " Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 173 (1952).1 6
"In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights,
the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or
even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions." Id. at 169.
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In Irvine v. California,'7 an effort was made by the petitioner to
extend the Rochin rule to evidence obtained by illegal entries into his
home. The Court, while finding the officers' conduct reprehensible, 18
held firmly to the principle of Wolf v. Colorado,'9 viz., "that in a
prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment
does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure." 20 In distinguishing Rochin from the facts before it,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Jackson, stated:
An effort is made, however, to bring this case under the
sway of Rochin v. California [Citation omitted]. That case
involved, among other things, an illegal search of the defendant's
person. But it also presented an element totally lacking here-
coercion . . .applied by a physical assault upon his person to
compel submission to the use of a stomach pump. This was the
feature which led to a result in Rochin contrary to that in Wolf.
Although Rochin raised the search-and-seizure question, this
Court studiously avoided it and never once mentioned the Wolf
case. Obviously, it thought that illegal search and seizure alone
did not call for reversal. However obnoxious are the facts in
the case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or
brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus
eavesdropping.21  (Emphasis added.)
Another unsuccessful attempt was made recently to have the Supreme
Court apply the Rochin doctrine, this time to a case involving the
making of a blood test. After a motor vehicle collision in which three
persons were killed, the defendant driver was suspected of being intoxi-
cated. While he was still unconscious from the accident, a physician
in the emergency room at the hospital took a blood sample of defendant
upon request of a police officer. On the basis of the results of the blood
test, defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The con-
viction was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Breithaupt
v. Abram,2.2 which held that the admission of the evidence did not violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The defendant's primary contention was that a conviction based
on evidence obtained from his body without his consent was a violation
17347 U. S. 128 (1954), 33 N. C. L. REv. 100.
18 "Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, delib-
erately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth
Amendment... ." 347 U. S. at 132.
9 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
Id. at 33.
21Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 133 (1954).
22352 U. S. 432 (1957).
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of due process. 28 The Court rejected the argument that Breithaupt was
indistinguishable from Rochin on the grounds that: (1) Although de-
fendant had not given his consent to the blood test, he had not expressly
withheld it;24 (2) the only person actively engaged in extracting the
evidence from the defendant's body was a skilled technician; and (3)"
the blood test procedure, as opposed to the administration of an emetic
solution, is a routine occurrence in the life of almost everyone. Thus,
the Court concluded that the action taken against the defendant was "not
such conduct that 'shocks the conscience' ... nor... offends a 'sense of
justice.' "25
In reaching the above conclusion the Court considered the degree
of the invasion of bodily integrity as weighed against its justification
in the light of the public interest in detection and deterrence of crime.
The degree of invasion in the taking of a blood test was found to be
less than that in the Rochin case where a "stomach pump" was used.
The menace to society from drunken driving tends toward vindication
of the bodily integrity invasion in the Breithaupt case.26 Public aware-
ness that judicial evidence may be obtained through blood tests is more
likely to deter drunken driving than the knowledge that judicial evi-
dence may be acquired by a "stomach pump" is apt to deter the illegal
use of narcotics.
An interesting point made by the Court in Breithaupt was that due
to the proven accuracy of the blood test for determining intoxication,
its judicial use will prevent the sober defendant-driver from being the
victim of unreliable lay testimony. For this reason, it would seem that
the Court has wisely excluded real evidence taken from the defendant's
body only when there has been coercion coupled with brutality, while
still excluding verbal confessions extracted by subtle, non-violent, yet
coercive means.27 Involuntary verbal confessions, whether obtained by
physical or psychological coercion, may well be forced from the innocent,
"Id. at 435. Defendant further contended that the use of the evidence consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and seizure and also violated the privilege against self
incrimination. These arguments were summarily dismissed by the Court on the
authority of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78 (1908). See notes 11 and 12 supra.
" For an argument that this point was not pertinent, see Chief Justice Warren's
dissent. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 440 (1957).
2 Id. at 437.
"0 "The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoid-
able, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield." Id. at
439.
To be sure, the curbing of the traffic in dope (Rochin) is as meritorious as the
reduction of traffic deaths due to intoxicated drivers, but the universality of the
latter problem makes it of primary public concern. But see the dissent of Chief
Justice Warren. Id. at 440.
" Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S.
143 (1944).
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while real evidence such as a blood test would seem to speak for itself.
From the foregoing, it appears that real evidence obtained by an
invasion of bodily integrity may be found inadmissible in state criminal
prosecutions as a violation of due process only if the obtaining of the
evidence is accompanied by brutality and coercion.28 However, this
exclusionary principle will be limited to evidence acquired from the body
and will not be extended to evidence procured by an unreasonable search
and seizure no matter how great the trespass of the close.29 Moreover,
the Court, in determining whether such conduct "shocks the conscience,"
apparently will consider the importance of detection and deterrence of
the particular crime as against the degree of the invasion of bodily
integrity.80
JoHrN T. ALLRED
Criminal Law-Trial De Novo-Power of Superior Court to Amend
Warrant
In a recent case' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that when
warrants upon which defendants were convicted in a municipal county
court were amended in the superior court so as to charge a trespass on
property of a person other than the person named in the original war-
rant, the court substituted one criminal charge for another. Since
on the appeal the defendants could only be tried for the crime for which
they were convicted in the lower court, the judgment on the amended
warrant was arrested.
The decision in this case raises the question of the power of the
superior court to allow amendments to warrants upon which defendants
were convicted in a lower court. As a general rule, upon appeal from
a court of inferior jurisdiction, the defendant is granted a trial de novo
in the superior court.2 The state may then try the defendant on the
original warrant s or by indictment charging the same offense of which
he was convicted in the lower court.4
As to the power of the superior court to allow amendments to pro-
ceedings begun before an inferior court, it is provided by statute that
"the court in which any such action shall be pending shall have power
to amend any warrant, process, pleading or proceeding in such action,
either in form or substance, for the furtherance of justice, on such terms
" Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), as limited by Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U. S. 432 (1957).
" Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954).
" Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432 (1957).
* State v. Cooke, 246 N. C. 518, 98 S. E. 2d 885 (1957).
* State v. Goff, 205 N. C. 545, 172 S. E. 407 (1934).
'State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 454, 73 S. E. 2d 283 (1952).
' State v. Wilson, 227 N. C. 43, 40 S. E. 2d 449 (1946).
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